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Abstract 
In her commentary of Field (1999), Hammerl (1999) has drawn attention to several 
interesting points concerning the issue of contingency awareness in evaluative 
conditioning. First, she comments on several contentious issues arising from Field's 
review of the evaluative conditioning literature, second she critiques the data from 
his pilot study and finally she argues the case that EC is a distinct form of 
conditioning that can occur in the absence of contingency awareness. With reference 
to these criticisms, this reply attempts to address Hammerl's comments by exploring 
the issues of how awareness is defined, how it is best measured, and whether it is 
reasonable to believe that EC uniformly occurs in the absence of contingency 
awareness. The article concludes that the available evidence supports Field's 
proposition that EC is, in fact, Pavlovian learning. 
1 Introduction 
Hammerl (1999) has provided food for though on my original paper (Field, 1999). 
The intention of the target article was to highlight certain pertinent issues about the 
role of contingency awareness in evaluative conditioning (EC). The themes of the 
paper were (a) distinguishing demand awareness from contingency awareness; (b) 
how might contingency awareness be best measured; and (c) whether the available 
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evidence suggests that EC can occur without contingency awareness and, if so, is EC 
is qualitatively distinct from other forms of Pavlovian conditioning. Hammerl (1999) 
raises questions concerning the literature review, the pilot study data and the 
conclusions drawn. In this reply I stick to the themes of the target article as a 
framework from which to address Hammerl's comments. 
2 The EC Literature 
2.1. Can contingencies be forgotten? 
Hammerl raises several objections to my interpretation of the EC literature. First, she 
suggests that the target article (Field, 1999) implies that the post-experimental 
awareness measurement occurs hours after the conditioning procedure. Although 
this impression was not deliberately created, she correctly re-iterates that awareness 
is measured subsequent to the re-rating of test stimuli. She asserts that this re-rating 
stage enables subjects to recognize and memorize the crucial stimuli and thus 
facilitates the subsequent measurement of awareness. Contrary to this proposition, 
Fulcher and Cocks (1997) showed empirically in a counterbalanced visual EC study 
that participants were significantly less able to recall UCSs following a standard EC 
rating stage than when asked to recall UCSs immediately after conditioning. 
Therefore, even the short re-rating stage to which Hammerl refers has a significant 
detrimental effect on participants' ability to recall contingencies. Moreover, unless 
CSs are presented alongside their corresponding UCS during the re-rating stage, it is 
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unclear why, as Hammerl suggests, this stage should facilitate the measurement of 
awareness —would it not distract participants' attention away from CS-UCS 
contingencies? 
2.2. Definitional problems: what do awareness measures actually 
measure? 
A second objection raise by Hammerl is that in many EC studies (notably her own) 
all participants are classified as unaware of all contingencies and so data cannot be 
subject to the statistical problems discussed in the target article (Field, 1999). If we 
look at these studies, with the exception of Hammerl and Grabitz (1993) in which the 
awareness measure is not reported, an awareness interview has been used. First, 
participants were asked whether anything in the experiment caught their eye or 
irritated them and if so, what? Second, participants were asked whether their second 
rating of the stimuli differed from the first and if so in what direction was the change 
and to what did they attribute this change? Finally, participants were asked whether 
they noticed regularities or patterns during the presentation of the pictures and if so 
did they notice these regularities during the presentations or subsequently (See 
Hammerl and Grabitz, 1996a, p. 283; Hammerl, Bloch and Silverthorne, 1997, p. 497). 
None of these questions relate to specific contingency awareness (the knowledge that 
a CS is consistently proceeded by a specific UCS, or picture of consistent affective 
value). Instead, questions relate only to whether participants believe their ratings to 
have changed or whether regularities in stimulus presentations were detected. It 
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could be argued that if participants did not notice regularities in the presentation of 
stimuli then they would be unlikely to posses exact knowledge of which CSs and 
UCSs were paired. However, it is unclear how participants might interpret the 
'regularities' or 'patterns' to which the question refers. The question relating to 
whether participants believe their ratings to have changed is problematic on two 
counts: (a) it relates very much to demand awareness (knowledge of what 
behavioural change is predicted), and (b) it does not refer specifically to either CSs or 
UCSs. On this later point, rating changes are expected for CSs but not UCSs, 
therefore, participants' ratings of stimuli are expected to change on only 50% of 
occasions. They are, therefore, unlikely to report that their ratings were generally 
changing. 
These criticisms by no means reflect on Hammerl and her colleagues — they have 
merely adapted their interview from other researcher — but they do highlight the 
point that before general conclusions are made about contingency awareness, 
researchers must be clear about what has been measured. In terms of Shanks and St. 
John's (1994) criteria for assessing contingency awareness, the measure described 
above raises questions regarding both the information and sensitivity criteria (see 
Field, 1999). In terms of information, the awareness interview lacks precision: it is 
unclear whether the questions tap demand awareness (awareness that ratings should 
change) or contingency awareness (knowledge that a particular CS is consistently 
preceded by a particular UCS, or by a picture of a particular affective value). 
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Participants are not required to recognise pairings, identify specific CS-UCS pairs, or 
specify the affective value of the picture paired with a particular CS and so the 
interview is more likely to address demand awareness than contingency awareness. 
If the interview lacks precision in terms of the information gathered, it must also lack 
sensitivity because a measure must surely be insensitive if it taps imprecise 
information. For these reasons, it is not surprising that Hammerl and her colleagues 
have found little evidence of contingency awareness in EC. However, it is reassuring 
that their studies probably do provide support for the argument that EC effects are 
established in the absence of demand awareness. 
As a final minor point of clarity, Hammerl notes that I incorrectly describe her 
studies as nondiscriminative. At the beginning of my target article (Field, 1999) I 
define a discriminative paradigm as one in which one CS is paired contingently with 
a UCS (CS+) whereas another is not (CS−). In her studies all CSs are paired 
contingently with a UCS (a neutral or positive stimulus) so by the definition I used 
they are not discriminative because no CS-only pairings are used. 
3 The Pilot Study 
3.1. Response to criticisms 
The pilot data presented in the target article (Field, 1999) were an adjunct to the main 
article: their purpose was to illustrate some of the theoretical points already made. 
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Hammerl criticises my use of an existing measure of contingency awareness on the 
grounds that I had previously suggested that the measure was flawed. I'm unclear as 
to why this objection is made: the point of the study was to compare new with old. 
To make any judgement about a new measure of contingency awareness it must be 
compared with one that presides over the literature — even if that measure is flawed. 
A more valid objection is that the 'old' awareness measure chosen as a comparison 
was a stringent measure and that a more informative comparison would be with a 
less-stringent measure. Some degree of misinterpretation appears to have occurred 
with regard to this issue. Hammerl states that the 'new' recognition measure was 
compared against the so-called 'strong' measure of awareness in which participants 
are given each CS as a prompt from which to identify the specific UCS with which it 
was paired. She suggests that a more instructive comparison would be to compare 
the recognition measure with what has been called the 'weak' measure of awareness 
in which subjects have only to identify the affective value of the UCS. I agree. 
However, the target article clearly states that for the strong measure 'a contingency 
was classified as aware … if the subject could identify the exact UCS with which it 
was paired during conditioning or chose one of the same affective value' [italics 
added](Field, 1999, p. XXX (quote is on p. 27 of target article Ms)). Therefore, the 
measure used was a compromise between the 'strong' and 'weak' measures of 
contingency awareness traditionally used. The only difference between the measure 
of awareness used by Field (1999) and the 'weak' measure to which Hammerl refers 
Evaluative Conditioning is Pavlovian Conditioning 
8 
was that participants were not explicitly allowed to indicate the affective value of the 
UCS. They were, however, permitted to pick a different picture of the same affective 
value as the UCS. As such, her criticism is partly unjustified. Nevertheless, I agree 
that comparing the recognition measure with the weakest possible measure would be 
an instructive additional experiment. However, the important point that the data 
illustrate (regardless of Hammerl's objections) is that different measurement 
procedures give rise to different contingency classifications. Specifically, even a fairly 
weak criterion for awareness (although not the weakest) results in considerable over-
classification of contingencies of which participants are deemed unaware when 
compared to a recognition measure. 
3.2. Which measure of contingency awareness should be used? 
Given that different measurement techniques give rise to different classification 
profiles for CS-UCS contingencies, the question arises of which method is best. 
Clearly a good measure of contingency awareness not only has to meet Shanks and 
St. Johns (1994) criteria, but must also distinguish between contingencies of which 
participants are aware and those of which participants are unaware. In doing so, 
contamination can be eliminated (see Field, 1999). To meet Shanks and St. John's 
(1994) criteria the measure must be precise both in terms of what it measures and 
how accurately it measures. My opinion, not surprisingly, is that the recognition 
measure described by Field (1999) meets the information criterion, because 
participants discriminate between actual and decoy pairings and so it can but only 
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measure contingency awareness (and not demand awareness). In addition, Field's 
(1999) data shows that it is more sensitive than some other commonly-used measures 
(although comparison with an even less stringent measure is necessary before a firm 
conclusion is made). Finally, because the recognition procedure measures awareness 
at a per contingency level, it allows contamination to be detected and eliminated. 
However, one concern might be that the recognition measure is over-sensitive, 
thus allowing participants to report awareness that they may not really posses. As 
ever it seems that the sensible recommendation is compromise: use a recognition 
measure in parallel with other measures (counterbalanced in order across subjects) 
and categorise contingencies on the basis of consensus between measures. Where no 
consensus can be found, classify contingencies on the basis of each measure 
separately, analyse the results, then compare the conclusions drawn. If the 
conclusions concur then interpretation of the data can be made with some 
confidence. If the conclusions differ then at least some insight can be gained into the 
relative sensitivity of the awareness measures. 
4 Theoretical Issues 
4.1. Hammerl's interpretation of the EC literature 
Hammerl cites a large body of work on affective priming, which shows that 
subliminal priming effects are often much stronger when participants are unaware of 
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the experimental manipulations. She concludes that these results 'indicate that 
demand awareness (otherwise as Field assumes) rather inhibits experimental effects 
than facilitating them'. It is important to be clear about whether we are discussing 
demand- or contingency-awareness (both defined earlier). In the affective priming 
literature there are no CS-UCS contingencies to learn (they are not conditioning 
experiments) and so researchers are not interested in whether subjects consciously 
associate two stimuli. Therefore, this evidence relates more to demand awareness 
than contingency awareness. I have already argued that the awareness measures 
used by Hammerl and her colleagues relate more to demand awareness than 
contingency awareness and, therefore, I agree that there is evidence that demand 
awareness sometimes does not influence experimental effects. However, this tells us 
little about the role of contingency awareness. 
In any case, the evidence Hammerl cites suggests that demand awareness inhibits 
experimental effects in priming experiments, it does not mean that demand 
awareness cannot inhibit experimental effects in other paradigms (such as 
conditioning experiments). There are studies suggesting that demand awareness can 
contribute to experimental effects when conditioning paradigms are used. For 
example, Allen and Janiszewski (1989) attempted to manipulate both demand- and 
contingency-awareness and found conditioning effects only in subjects who were 
demand aware or contingency aware. In addition, many studies have shown that 
effects believed to represent true associative learning can actually be attributed to the 
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effects of demand awareness (for example, Page, 1969, 1974; Kellaris & Cox, 1989; 
Darley & Lim, 1993; but see Shimp, Hyatt, & Snyder, 1993).  
Hammerl also summarises some new research in which a distracter task is used to 
reduce contingency-awareness (Hammerl & Grabitz, 1996b, 1999). I welcome this 
systematic approach to the contingency-awareness issue, and am especially relieved 
to see the use of appropriate between-subject controls such as the BSB control (Field, 
1996, 1997). Although these studies are, at present, difficult to evaluate (one is 
available as only an abstract and the other is, as yet, unpublished) they look like 
interesting work. The general finding is that subjects classified as unaware show 
conditioning effects whereas those classified as aware show opposite effects (so-
called 'conscious counter-control'). There are two issues pertinent to these studies. 
The first is that although the use of a distracter seems like a neat way of reducing 
contingency awareness, levels of contingency awareness still have to be measured. 
Hammerl reports that the 'weak' measure of awareness was used and I can but 
assume that this measure is the one employed in her previous studies. If so, then I 
question whether contingency awareness has actually been measured (see earlier). 
Therefore, the results of subjects classified as aware or unaware may reflect demand 
awareness more than contingency awareness. However, that's not to say that levels 
of contingency awareness weren't lower in the group that did the distracter task — 
it's just difficult to tell from the measure used. As a second point, if the measure used 
was the one that Hammerl traditionally employs then contingency awareness was 
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not measured on a per-contingency basis. Therefore, conclusions about levels of 
classification contamination, if any, cannot be made. Despite these observations I 
applaud this systematic approach and hope that in future work different measures of 
contingency awareness might be used to unpack the role of contingency awareness 
in EC further. 
4.2. Theoretical basis of EC: is it qualitatively different from other 
forms of Pavlovian conditioning? 
Contrary to Hammerl's interpretation, I had no intention of implying that autonomic 
conditioning occurs only when participants have knowledge of the contingencies of 
conditioning. The point I tried to highlight was that different methodologies 
invariably give rise to different conclusions about the role of contingency awareness: 
typically, recall measures give rise to the conclusion that conditioning occurs without 
contingency awareness, whereas recognition measures tend to show conditioning 
only with contingency awareness (Dawson, 1973, Dawson & Schell, 1987). The 
important implication from this observation is that because EC researchers 
exclusively use recall measures of awareness it is not surprising that these studies 
have shown conditioning without awareness. Important is that the experiments 
showing that EC apparently occurs without contingency awareness have been used 
to support the theoretical position that EC is qualitatively distinct from other forms 
of Pavlovian learning (Baeyens, Eelen, & van den Bergh, 1990). If recall measures of 
awareness give rise to the conclusion of conditioning without awareness in both 
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autonomic conditioning experiments (see Dawson & Schell, 1987) and EC studies, 
then EC is not qualitatively distinct using this criterion. 
Hammerl concludes by arguing that EC is interesting not just because of the 
awareness issue, but also because it has been shown to be sensitive to sensory-
preconditioning (Hammerl & Grabitz, 1996a) and postconditioning revaluation 
(Hammerl et al., 1997; Baeyens, Eelen, van den Bergh, & Crombez, 1992). In addition, 
much is made of the apparent finding that EC is resistant to extinction (Baeyens, 
Eelen, & Crombez, 1995). There is now substantial evidence that the visual EC 
paradigm is prone to an artefact that gives rise to conditioning-like effects not due to 
associative learning (Field & Davey, 1997, 1998, 1999; Shanks and Dickinson, 1990) 
and so evidence for some of the phenomena cited by Hammerl is equivocal (see 
Field, 1997; Field & Davey, 1998). Nevertheless, even if we assume that these 
phenomena genuinely exist, sensory pre-conditioning and postconditioning 
revaluation are characteristics that we have come to expect in ordinary classical 
conditioning (see Dickinson, 1980 for a review). This leaves only resistance-to-
extinction as a distinguishing characteristic of EC. Although there is evidence for 
resistance to extinction using visual stimuli (Baeyens, Crombez, van den Bergh, & 
Eelen, 1988) this evidence has been empirically questioned by Field and Davey 
(1999). The best evidence for resistance-to-extinction in the EC paradigm comes from 
studies in which tastes are used as stimuli. Notably, these studies show that neutral 
flavours acquire negative evaluations through contiguous pairing with unpleasant 
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flavours (for example see Baeyens, Eelen, van den Bergh, & Crombez, 1990). 
Nevertheless, there is evidence that resistance-to-extinction can occur in other 
conditioning paradigms also. First, Sclafani (1991) reviews several studies that show 
resistance to extinction in Pavlovian conditioning paradigms using food stimuli with 
rats. Second, Grant (1964) distinguished between Pavlovian A and Pavlovian B 
conditioning; in the later form the effect of the UCS is independent of instrumental 
acts by the organism. As such, Pavlovian B conditioning is typified by the 
conditioning of ecologically important responses such as illness, fear and anxiety. 
Eysenck and Kelly (1987) argue that extinction is unlikely to occur in Pavlovian B 
condition and that it is even possible that the strength of the conditioned response 
will increase over extinction trials (incubation). The EC paradigm that shows the best 
evidence of resistance to extinction uses flavour stimuli and so could, arguably, be an 
example of Pavlovian B conditioning because it involves inescapable consequences 
(illness or disgust). Finally, even in autonomic conditioning paradigms, Davey (1987) 
has shown that extinction may be highly dependent on cognitive factors: resistance-
to-extinction may occur when participants believe that their responses are being 
maintained. Davey (1994) has also pointed out that the experimental subterfuge used 
in some EC studies may well lead participants to believe that their responses should 
persist. There is little hard evidence about the belief-state of a participant undergoing 
an EC extinction procedure; however, it is perfectly plausible that the observed 
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findings result from the types of cognition that Davey (1987) described in autonomic 
paradigms. 
Hammerl's assertion that, based on the apparent characteristics that have been 
demonstrated, EC is qualitatively distinct from Pavlovian conditioning seems 
unjustified. It is equally unclear why, on a theoretical level, EC should be any 
different from autonomic Pavlovian learning. In my target article (Field, 1999) I 
suggested that in the autonomic conditioning literature there is, ceteris paribus, better 
evidence that conditioning in the absence of contingency awareness can occur in 
ecologically-relevant conditioning episodes such a fear-relevant CS predicting a fear-
evoking UCS (see Öhman, Esteves & Soares, 1995). I also suggested that EC may not 
distinct from other forms of Pavlovian conditioning but likewise have a subset of 
ecologically-important domains (e.g. taste) in which the 'normal rules' do not apply 
(see Field, 1999). These observations might gel with Grant's (1964) idea of Pavlovian 
B conditioning, in that a certain subset of ecologically important responses may obey 
different laws of conditioning. Therefore, EC may appear distinct only because its 
unusual properties have been demonstrated using certain types of conditioning 
episodes (those that might fall into the category of Pavlovian B conditioning). 
The studies that Hammerl cites as evidence for EC in the absence of contingency 
awareness (Hammerl & Grabitz, 1996b, 1999) used haptic stimuli. Intuitively, these 
physical sensations could be thought of as having ecological relevance (for example, 
it might be very important to learn about unpleasant sensations from abrasive 
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surfaces to prevent injury or pain). Therefore, even if these studies bear up to 
scrutiny their results support the position that conditioning occurs without 
contingency awareness only when the learning episode is ecologically relevant (e.g. 
tasting, smelling, touching). Intuitively, learning these types of responses quickly, 
and without awareness or extinction may afford an organism adaptive benefit: it will 
learn — with little cognitive expense — to like/approach healthy foods or pleasant 
haptic environments and dislike/avoid toxins and environments likely to cause pain. 
However, it is less clear what adaptive benefit arises from learning to like/dislike 
stimuli merely from seeing them in parallel with other liked/disliked objects. It is 
perhaps more plausible that in these circumstances an organism would use the 
category- and similarity-based behaviour reviewed by Field and Davey (1999). 
A convincing account of why EC is a distinct form of Pavlovian conditioning must 
first unequivocally demonstrate the unusual characteristics with which it is currently 
associated but outside of ecologically-relevant response systems. Even then, the 
theoretical basis of EC needs to incorporate some account of the adaptive benefit, if 
any, of this form of learning. As it stands, the evidence for EC seems only to mimic 
what's been found in Pavlovian conditioning generally (at least, Pavlovian B 
conditioning) and in this sense EC is not a distinct form of Pavlovian learning. 
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